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Emission Modifications: Overview
by Robert E. Neligan*
The theme of this conference is "to explore
instances in which unexpected and perhaps
unwelcome secondary effects, repercussions
and or feedbacks have developed in biomete-
orological relationships as a result of the
imposition of some environmental control
measure." I would like to speak on this theme
from the viewpoint of the control strategist.
The Clean Air Act of 1970, in brief, estab-
lished a national air pollution control pro-
gram which called for the measurement of
health effects to determine air quality stand-
ards and the development of a schedule of
emission controls or regulations which would
achieve these standards within certain time
frames.
In order to carry out the mandates of the
Clean Air Act, control actions had to be de-
veloped and implemented. Such actions in
almost all cases were of an extremely compli-
cated nature and in many cases aroused two
extreme reactions. At one pole, so to speak,
is a group that recommends that control
actions wait until all scientific solutions have
been explored and completely validated be-
fore control programs are established. At
the other pole is a group that insists on
immediate action, abandoning any scientific
approach and that actions be made on the
basis of arbitrary judgment or intuition.
The first group, who believe that all of the
scientific information must be known before
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actions are taken, are in effect making a de-
cision that no action be taken until all the
results are in, no matter how long it took.
This position was untenable from the view-
point of the congressional mandate and pub-
lic policy issues. The second group, who
desired immediate action, no matter how ar-
bitrary, is also in error, as such precipitous
actions could lead to control programs that
increase the probability that resulting control
measures would be technologically or econom-
ically impractical or result in social upheavals
that would not be acceptable to the vast ma-
jority of the public.
The pollution control official is exposed to
the arguments of these two groups daily.
He is faced on many occasions with decisions
that must be made, knowing full well that the
information available to him to arrive at a
decision is uncertain at best. He fully realizes
that if the decision to control emission is
unnecessarily strict, that it may result in
wasted money, natural resources and possible
adverse biometeorological effects. Yet the
prudent control official must set his control
policies by resolving any uncertainties in
favor of the public's health, even if such
decisions may prove to be unnecessarily
strict. He must also make his decisions with
the realization that he does not know, and
may not for many years, that the control
measure may have some unknown side effects
that could be detrimental to the public health
and welfare. His decisions in science, engi-
neering, and particularly business, must and
usually are made on data and information
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be made. The decision maker is, and perhaps
always will, be faced with a degree of risk
in the making of his decisions.
I will attempt to relate only a few instances
where to my knowledge unexpected and un-
welcomed secondary effects have taken place
in the imposition of environmental control
measures. Certainly, the replacement of more
highly reactive hydrocarbons with less reac-
tive hydrocarbons appears to have improved
the oxidant problem in local areas, but has
resulted in higher oxidant formations in
downwind receptor sites. The substitution of
aromatic hydrocarbons for lead to enhance
the octane rating of gasoline would result
both in higher local oxidant formation and
increased concentrations of polynuclear com-
pounds having carcinogenic properties unless
some type of catalytic control device is used.
Certainly, the catalytic muffler has come
under suspicion lately, due to the possible
oxidation of sulfur in the gasoline to a sul-
fate form. The use of after-burners, when
not properly maintained, can result in the
formation of more highly reactive hydro-
carbons that those it is designed to control.
The tall stack is another instance of a control
strategy providing relief to a small local area
causing detrimental effects many miles away
downwind.
In the area of solid waste control, we have
experience various detrimental side effects.
Ifmaterial is buried in an unsatisfactory way
it can cause pollution of underground water
supplies or produce volatile hydrocarbons de-
composition products which ultimately perco-
late up through the soil, and, if buildings are
built above the landfill, can accumulate and
explode. When solid wastes are burned, emis-
sions of such metals as lead or mercury may
result. Even the use of sludge as a fertilizer
or soil builder has its drawback: trace metals
present in the sludge can be taken up by
crops and introduced into man and animal
via the digestion of food. Yet we must dispose
of our waste materials or their sheer bulk
would overcome us.
This thought leads me to a rather inter-
esting fact that I read some time ago. The
point was made that the invention and pro-
liferation of the automobile, even with its
effect upon the quality of the air, had over-
come a serious waste disposal problem: if
horses were still used for transportation and
services on the island of Manhattan, horse
manure would accumulate to a height of 10
ft daily. No one consciously determined
around the turn of the century that the auto-
mobile was a solution to a waste disposal
problem; if he had, he would not have been
able to foresee, through the scientific infor-
mation available at that time, the great effect
that the motor vehicle would have by mid-
century on our ambient atmosphere.
In the technological society in which we
live in today, there are, and will continue to
be, actions taken in the form of control meas-
ures which undoubtedly will have some unex-
pected side effects. The answer to reducing
or avoiding such effects in the future is, of
course, to call for more research to be per-
formed and information obtained, before
such environmental control actions are put
into widespread use. I am sure that there is
no one present today who would not desire
more information in. any field of endeavor
that he is associated with, before he has to
make as significant decision. He must, there-
fore, be prepared to continue to insist that
more resources be put into research and the
development and the collection of informa-
tion in a timely manner so that he might be
better informed at the time critical decisions
have to be made. Certainly, the most prudent
course of action would be that we not allow
any man-made pollutant to go into the at-
mosphere. However, as we all know, this is
not technically or economically feasible at
this time.
Before closing, I would like to quote Sena-
tor Muskie speaking on the topic of air pollu-
tion control: "You cannot wait in this field
until you eliminate all the uncertainties or
unveil all of the unknowns. If we had done
that, we would not have the Clean Air Act.
You have to work with the best available in-
formation." I believe that it is the task of all
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to do our utmost to see that the best informa-
tion is available.
Discussion
G. C. HASS (Vehicle Emissions Control Program,
California Air Resources Board): The abatement
of systems which change the composition or content
of effluents would call for the undoing of almost
every vehicle emissions control measure undertaken
in the United States since 1960. Most of the control
schemes in use involve to some degree a change in
the composition of the exhaust gases.
The first step was crankcase emissions control,
which inherently had the undesired effect of increas-
ing carbon monoxide exhaust emissions as blowby
rates increased from engine wear. The advent of
engine modifications to control exhaust emissions of
hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide coincidentally
increased the emissions of nitrogen oxides. Abate-
ment of the nitrogen oxides introduced further
changes in the composition of the organic fraction
of exhaust emissions. Even evaporative emission
controls result in the introduction of hydrocarbons
into the carburetor after a soak period, with con-
sequent temporary increase in cabon monoxide
emissions.
The response of the California regulatory au-
thorities to these events was first outright prohibi-
tion of undesired emissions, followed closely by more
or less successful attempts at their limitation. These
efforts are currently tied to the General Standards
statement in the Federal Register: ". . . shall not
in its operation or function cause the emission into
the ambient air of any noxious or toxic substance
that would not be emitted in the operation of such
vehicle without such system, except as specifically
permitted by regulation;" This prohibition may be
read as qualitative, quantitative, or both.
Making tradeoff decisions in vehicle emissions
control has been made more difficult by the concen-
tration on threshold levels as exemplified by the
Air Quality Standards approach. Real-life decisions
frequently involve tradeoffs between two or more
pollutants at levels far above threshold. In the
absence of understandable inputs concerning the
relative undesirability of the pollutants, decision-
makers can only apply their emotions and intuition,
or, like Hamlet, decide rather to "bear those ills
we have than fly to others that we know not of."
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